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DISCRETE-EVENT SIMULATION MODELING  
OF THE REPAIRABLE INVENTORY PROCESS TO ENHANCE  




The objective of this project was to identify and more accurately predict the 
maintenance and supply chain costs and savings related to the Agile Rapid Global 
Combat Support (ARGCS) system.  The project focused on a portion of the ARGCS 
business case analysis (BCA) model developed by CDR David Crosby.  CDR Crosby’s 
BCA model listed various potential savings associated with ARGCS technologies that 
were difficult to quantify during his initial BCA research.  The focus of this research was 
to determine the likely benefits, and/or cost savings that ARGCS may have on 
maintenance and supply functions. Using pre-existing maintenance and supply data, a 
simulation model was developed to more accurately determine any maintenance and /or 
supply related cost benefits.  The goal was to provide better accuracy on the associated 
costs and benefits of ARGCS technologies, thus enhancing the accuracy and merit of 
future BCAs.  The only F/A-18 Weapons Replaceable Assemblies (WRA) that were 
analyzed during this research project were those that will be tested during the summer 
2007 Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) at Lemoore Naval Air 
Station.  Results of the simulation indicate there is an expected increase in operational 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The objective of this project was to identify and more accurately predict the 
maintenance and supply chain costs and savings related to the Agile Rapid Global 
Combat Support (ARGCS) system.  The project focused on a portion of the ARGCS 
business case analysis (BCA) model developed by CDR David Crosby.  CDR Crosby’s 
BCA model listed various potential savings associated with the ARGCS system that were 
difficult to quantify during his initial BCA research.  The focus of this research was to 
determine the potential benefits, and/or cost savings that ARGCS may have on 
maintenance and supply functions. Using pre-existing maintenance and supply data, a 
simulation model was developed to more accurately determine any maintenance and 
supply related cost benefits.  The goal was to provide better accuracy on the associated 
costs and benefits of the ARGCS system, thus enhancing the accuracy and merit of future 
BCA analysis.  The only F/A-18 Weapons Replaceable Assemblies (WRA) that were 
analyzed during this research project were those that will be tested during the summer 
2007 Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) at Lemoore Naval Air 
Station. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The ARGCS Business Case Analysis presently being produced by the Naval 
Postgraduate School identifies many costs and benefits of this new system that are 
difficult to quantify.  The following questions are the focus of this research: 
1.   What are the cost savings associated with faster Test Program Set (TPS) 
run times with Smart TPS and parallel testing incorporated? 
2.   What Operational/Intermediate Level (O/I-Level) savings are associated 
with more accurate/timely troubleshooting? 
3.   What spares cost savings will be realized as a result of lower Time to 
Repair (TTR)? 
4.   What cost savings will result from reduced transportation of WRA’s sent 
off site? 
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5.   Does ARGCS increase repair capability (I-level) of already repairable 
WRA’s?  If so, how will this affect supply chain outcomes like cost and 
readiness? 
6.   What cost savings can be realized from identification of WRA’s with 
higher than average fail rates, a.k.a. “Bad Actors?” 
7.   How many Maintenance Man-hours can be saved due to faster test times? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This research project modeled the current F/A-18 repairable supply chain at the 
Fleet Readiness Center (FRC) level using Arena Simulation Modeling software to predict 
potential readiness benefits of ARGCS.  The potential readiness benefits researched 
included increased mission capable rates (operational availability), labor cost savings, 
repair cost savings, and reduced spare levels.  Information gathered from various 
historical references was utilized to build the model.  The intent was to assume as little as 
possible about the process.  Although many historical facts were gathered, the model still 
contains assumptions that limit its ability to predict the benefits of implementing the 
ARGCS with 100% accuracy.  Furthermore, due to the extreme difficulty of simulating 
every possible maintenance action (both scheduled and unscheduled) for the large 
number of aircraft supported by an FRC, the simulation only looks at the unscheduled 
maintenance aspect of four WRAs through the F/A-18 repair cycle.  Specifically the 
model simulates the repair cycle of the F/A-18 APG-65 Radar Target Data Processor, 
Receiver Exciter, Antenna, and the CP1330/ASW-44 Roll Pitch Yaw Computer (a.k.a. 
Flight Control Computer, FCC). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A.  DESCRIPTION OF ARGCS 
ARGCS is an ACTD research program which seeks to incorporate new 
technologies in the areas of diagnostics, testing and repair for weapon systems, and inter-
service test software interoperability.  “ACTDs are designed to allow users to gain an 
understanding of potential new capabilities for which there is no user experience base” 
and in the end provide the Warfighter the opportunity to “make an assessment of the 
military utility of the proposed capability.”1  Within this framework, ARGCS is being 
developed to provide greater efficiency and effectiveness in the test, repair and 
maintenance functions of the services. 
Proponents of ARGCS argue that existing systems are antiquated, cumbersome, 
inflexible, and lack the interoperability required to promote efficiencies of scale and 
scope.  Current systems are stove-piped and fail to promote common functionality over a 
cross section of users.  These structural inefficiencies entail a larger proliferation of 
automated test equipment (ATE) than might be achievable by incorporating current 
technologies that can not only increase efficiencies, but allow for an architecture that will 
be able to incorporate future technologies. 
As proposed, the ARGCS technologies will integrate Automatic Test System 
(ATS) hardware and software with a net-centric support system designed to improve 
electronic systems maintenance.  The ARGCS concept will combine building block, 
state-of-the-art instrumentation with an open system architecture that will be compatible 
with legacy TPSs currently in use by the Services and potentially prove the concept of 
interservice test software interoperability.  The support system, called the ARGCS 
Distance Support and Response (ADSR) system, will facilitate data sharing and improve 
diagnostic capabilities. 
                                                 
1 Office of Secretary of Defense, “Advanced Systems and Concepts, Advanced Concepts/ Joint 
Capabilities Technical Demonstrations” website, http://www.acq.osd.mil/actd/intro.htm, accessed October 
13, 2006. 
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The TPSs are combinations of hardware and software that have been created to 
test specific equipment using specific ATSs.  In the current state, the different services 
use different ATSs.  The ARGCS system will use interface adaptors to connect legacy 
TPSs to a common test interface on its ATS.  This has the potential to allow for a 
common ATS for all Services without re-engineering existing TPSs. 
In concept, the ARGCS Distance Support and Response (ADSR) will work with 
ATSs and other diagnostic equipment by using internet connectivity to populate a central 
database providing more information to maintenance personnel in the field and more 
precise unit testing capabilities.  The ADSR architecture allows data to be collected at all 
levels of maintenance (Operational, Intermediate, and Depot) to perform more exacting 
maintenance at each activity.  ARGCS proponents claim that the technology will allow 
the reuse of weapon system-level built-in-test information and historical system failure 
data to continually improve the quality of the diagnostics.  Fault event/diagnostic data 
along with maintainer assessments will be collected and automatically evaluated to 
develop guidance and recommendations to subsequent similar events.  Conceptually, the 
architecture will also provide the capability for remote Subject Matter Experts to assist 
on-scene maintenance personnel.2 
 
                                                 
2 Business Case Analysis: Agile Rapid Global Combat Support. MBA Professional Report. Naval 
Postgraduate School.  CDR David Crosby, 2006. 
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III. SIMULATION MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. MODEL DESCRIPTION, ASSUMPTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS 
The model developed for this research project attempted to simulate a repair cycle 
based on the Fleet Readiness Center (FRC) concept. The FRC concept is the Navy’s new 
“center of excellence” concept in which I-level repair is centralized to one of six 
locations based on repair expertise.  This allows I-level technicians to work side-by-side 
with local “In Service Repair Depot” artisans in the AIMD facility, thereby reducing 
repair cycle times and inventory, while increasing “Ready-for-Issue” (RFI) rates.  NAS 
Lemoore is one of the designated FRCs for the WRAs (Radar & RPYC) applicable to this 
project.  In other words, NAS Lemoore will repair not only the WRAs from its location, 
but will also repair WRAs from NAS Fort Worth and NAS Fallon.  Based on the 
approximate number of F/A-18 squadrons (approx. 12) from the three different locations, 
the FRC West at Lemoore AIMD will support a WRA (Radar/RPYC) inventory for 
roughly 144 aircraft.  This is the number of aircraft used for the simulation.  Additionally, 
the model accounts for unscheduled maintenance only.  It was proven through many trials 
that individually scheduling all 144 aircraft to account for the numerous scheduled 
downtimes a typical F/A-18 goes through each year was futile. 
With the use of Arena software, this project attempted an “As-Is” simulation of 
the existing repair cycle of F/A-18 aircraft.  In theory, it would be possible to change 
various factors within the model that are influenced by the ARGCS system and then 
observe how these factors affect the average number of FMC aircraft, operational 
availability, operational level repair costs, intermediate level labor costs, average Depot 
level repair costs, and associated transportation costs.  All of these are questions requiring 
answers for the ARGCS Business Case Analysis being conducted by the Naval 




Figure 1.     F/A-18 Repair Cycle Simulation Model 
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Because of the many factors involved in the repair process, and the lack of some 
data, certain assumptions had to be made in order to build the simulation model.  These 
assumptions are highlighted and explained throughout this chapter and are important to 
keep in mind when using the results of the simulation for the ARGCS Business Case 
Analysis. 
The basic building blocks for Arena are called modules, which define the process 
being simulated.  Figure 2 represents the first three modules of the simulation.  The first 
module, Create FA_18s, is the “birth” node for arrival of entities to the model’s 
boundary.3  By creating the entities, in this case aircraft, the model can now simulate 
whatever process is built for it.  The next module, Flightline, simply provides an avenue 
for entities to return later once they’ve been through one of the many possible lines of the 
model.  This module has no effect on the entities.  The last module in Figure 2, One more 
AC, adds two variables to the simulation.  The first creates a Fully Mission Capable 
(FMC) aircraft and the other calculates operational availability. 
 
Create FA_18s One more ACFlightline
0       
Figure 2.     Create Module/FMC and Op Avail Calculation 
 
The next section of the model, shown in Figure 3, establishes the Failure Rate of 
the aircraft entities.  The first module in this section, AC_Failure, causes the aircraft 
entities to delay for a specific time period.  Due to the fact that the model is based on 
time, and most components on an aircraft follow an exponential failure distribution, an 
exponential distribution was used to represent the MTBF of each aircraft.  The aircraft 
MTBF assumed for the simulation was 5.1 hours. This number was chosen based on 
discussions with Naval personnel and the project team’s personal experience of flight line 
operations.  Assuming each aircraft flies an average of 10 hours per week (3 to 4 sorties), 
and there are 168 hours in a week, each aircraft flies 1.4 hours per day (10 hours / 7 
                                                 
3 W. David Skelton, Randall P. Sadowski, David T. Sturrock, Simulation with Arena, Third Edition 
(New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2004), p. 57.  
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days).  To adjust for the continuous clock time of the simulation model, the aircraft 
MTBF was divided by 0.06 (10/168) which resulted in an MTBF of 85 hours for the 
simulation.  This equates to an aircraft failing once every 2-3 flights based on the 
assumption that flights generally last 1.5 to 3 hours (typical for fighter aircraft The 85 
hours accounts for both ground and flying time. This operational tempo could be 
increased or decreased by changing the numerator in the MTBF equation and changing 
the model accordingly.  It is reasonable to assume that any change in the operational 
tempo would have some effect on the entire model; however, the operational tempo was 
not changed during this research due to time constraints. 
The second module, Record 43, simply counts the failures as they are released 
from the previous module.  This module is not necessary for the model to work, but 




     0  
Figure 3.     AC Failure/Record 
 
The first module in Figure 4, Number of Failures, establishes a variable to be used 
in a decision made in the next module, Fail Limiter.  The Fail Limiter module makes a 
decision to limit the number of failures allowed to proceed through the simulation. After 
several runs, the simulation model revealed that aircraft failures increased when repair 
cycle times were reduced.  This anomaly was caused by the aircraft and WRAs being 
repaired faster, which enabled them to enter the Flightline module at a faster rate and in 
turn enter the AC_Failure module more often.  Realistically this would not happen.    In 
the aircraft operations world, there is a familiar saying, “Plan what you fly, and fly what 
you plan.”  Aircraft do not break more just because they are repaired faster.  In addition, 
they are not normally flown more just because there are a higher number of average FMC 
aircraft available.  This increased failure rate occurs in our model because of our 
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modeling decision to model total aircraft hours.  Hence greater availability of aircraft 
translates into a greater number of aircraft failures.  The decision to model total aircraft 
hours was made for parsimony, and to keep the model tractable.  As a consequence 
however, we needed some method to keep the failure rate from increasing so accurate 
costs savings could be calculated.  To limit these additional failures, the aforementioned 
Fail Limiter was used to prohibit more than the preset number of failures to continue 
through the simulation.  The failure limit is based on the minimum average number of 
failures generated by the base scenario (10,310 failures).  While this ‘failure limit’ 
approach does not affect the average failure rate, it will affect the distribution of failures.  
In other words the failures will occur early in the simulation and then cease later in the 
simulation.  We were unsure exactly how much this skewing impacted operational 
availability, so to negate any impact on operational availability a terminating condition 
was established to provide a more accurate result.  This fail limiter and terminating 
condition are discussed in greater detail in the model results section.  Here, we simply 
note that the need to incorporate this module means our operational availability results 
are an approximation, and that our model should be considered a heuristic.  While we 
have incorporated essential variables in a way that is satisfactory for the purposes and 
limited scope of this report, the numerical results for operational availability should not 
be considered exact.  The final module in this section, Failures, is another record module 







Failures0      
0  
Figure 4.     Fail Limit Section 
 
The module, Decide 4, in Figure 5 is a crucial element of this simulation.  Since 
there are pre-identified WRAs the ACTD will run during future tests of the ARGCS, a 
percentage of total failures was established.  Based on the average number of annual 
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failures of each WRA4, a percentage of aircraft failures take a path to one of four WRA 
repair cycles.  There are no distinctions of individual WRA failures, only that each failure 









Figure 5.     What Broke? Decision 
 
The failures that do not enter one of the WRA repair cycles are directed to the 
Other NMC Mx module (Figure 6), where they are delayed for an assumed exponential 
delay of 10 hours to account for all other unscheduled maintenance actions.  This delay is 
very rough, but is based on personal experience.  For example, some flight line repairs 
can take as little as 30 minutes, while others may take several days to complete.  The 
numerous failures possible outside the scope of the WRAs studied in this project could 
not be fine tuned to a completely accurate number.  However, with over 25 years of flight 
line experience, the project team members agreed that 10 hours was a fairly reasonable 
number.  Additionally, we felt as long this repair time stayed constant throughout the 




Figure 6.     Other NMC Mx Module 
 
                                                 
4 NAVAIR Informational CDROM, APG-65 Radar Fleet Support Team & Wyle Laboratories, Inc. 
Aerospace Group Integrated Logistics Supportability Team, October 2006. 
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A total of 17% of aircraft failures enter one of the four WRA repair cycles, each 
based on historical repair data.5  Table 1 represents the percentage of total failures routed 
to the applicable WRAs and the resulting base model failures.  The percentages chosen 
were based on recreating the actual number of average failures over the last 5 years.  For 
example, the average number of Radar Target Data Processors (RTDP) sent for repair 
was 202.8 RTDPs per year.6  In order to achieve this number of failures in the model 
results, the desired number of failures was divided into the total number of failures 
(202.8/10,310) resulting in 2% of total failures.  The same method was used to determine 
the percentage of total failures for each WRA.  The average number of failures per year 
varies slightly due to time distributions within the model as well as averaging of the 
replication results. 
 




RPYC 7% 722  
Table 1.   WRA Failure Percentage 
 
The model splits in five possible paths after the Decide 4 module.  As previously 
stated, this module routes a predetermined percentage of failures to the maintenance 
cycle for the WRAs being analyzed.  All other failures proceed to the Other NMC Mx 
Submodel seen in Figure 6.  This submodel includes a module which reduces the number 
of FMC aircraft and recalculates operational availability to account for an aircraft that is 
now Non-Mission Capable (NMC).  The second module located in this submodel, delays 
the aircraft using an exponential distribution.  As previously mentioned, this delay is to 
account for the time required to repair all other NMC conditions. 
 
                                                 
5 NAVAIR Informational CDROM, APG-65 Radar Fleet Support Team & Wyle Laboratories, Inc. 
Aerospace Group Integrated Logistics Supportability Team, October 2006. 
6 NAVAIR Informational CDROM, APG-65 Radar Fleet Support Team, October 2006. 
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The failures that are routed to one of the WRA maintenance cycles must first pass 
through the submodels seen in Figure 7.  Each submodel contains a decide module able to 
reduce the number of failures entering the associated maintenance cycle to simulate a 
reduction in false pulls of that WRA. 
 





Figure 7.     False Pull Submodels 
 
A false pull is defined as a WRA that was removed to correct an aircraft failure, 
but actually wasn’t the cause of the failure.  To determine the false pull rate of each 
WRA, the number of “no fault found” actions at the I-level was compared to total failures 
for the applicable WRA at the O-level (Table 2)7.  A record module was also used to 
count the number of false pulls to assist in interpreting the simulation results.  These false 
pulls are routed to the AC_Failures module to await another failure. 
 




RPYC 8%  
Table 2.   WRA False Pull Rates 
 
The next few modules, Figure 8, represent the start of the maintenance process for 
the failed aircraft.  Although each WRA maintenance cycle is built identically, the Radar 
TDP is represented in Figure 8.  The Record 20 module simply counts the number of 
entities entering each maintenance path. 
                                                 
7 NAVAIR Informational CDROM, APG-65 Radar Fleet Support Team & Wyle Laboratories, Inc. 
Aerospace Group Integrated Logistics Supportability Team, October 2006. 
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The next module, Break for RT, is used to reduce the FMC total by one and to 
recalculate operational availability.  Next, the Radar TDP removal module is where the 
actual maintenance of the WRA starts.  First, an O-level Sailor is assigned to accomplish 
the removal of the WRA from the aircraft.  This seizure has an associated cost (repair 
cost)8 representing half of the charge to the unit associated with ordering the part from 
supply (the remaining cost will be charged when the WRA is replaced).  Each WRA 
repair process starts with removal and ends with installation of the replacement WRA.  
The time required to remove or install any WRA is based on many factors such as 
technician experience, location of the WRA, and environmental.  Since these factors are 
very hard to predict, a triangular delay distribution was assumed for repair and 
installation of WRAs using a minimum of .5 hours, a most likely delay of 1 hour, and a 
maximum delay of 1.5 hours per maintenance action.  These delays are based on personal 
experience and actual technician estimates. 
 




Figure 8.     Introduction into Maintenance Cycle 
 
The next submodel, Figure 9, includes several modules that separate the 
components from the aircraft and bring the aircraft back together with a Ready-for-Issue 
(RFI) WRA.  In addition to the aforementioned processes, the WRA enters its repair 




Figure 9.     Maintenance Cycle Submodel 
 
                                                 
8 Navy Inventory Control Point Asset Visibility System, https://www.navsup.navy.mil, accessed 
August 2006. 
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First, an explanation of the modules in Figure 10 is necessary to understand how 
the aircraft gets repaired without waiting for the WRA to go through the repair cycle.  
The Separate module splits the aircraft entity into two parts.  By doing this, the 
simulation allows the aircraft entity to proceed to two different paths. 
 
Ori g i n a l











0      
     0      0
0      
     0
0       
Figure 10.     Separating WRA from Aircraft 
 
The original aircraft entity proceeds to a delay module, Admin Delay at Supply 
Department.  A triangular delay distribution was assumed for this module with a 
minimum of .5 hours, a most likely delay of 1 hour, and a maximum delay of 1.5 hours 
per supply action.  This delay is based on project team personal experience.  Then, the 
aircraft proceeds to the Pool module to receive a replacement WRA.  That concludes the 
aircraft flow through this process. 
The duplicate aircraft entity of the Separate module proceeds to an Assign module 
where it becomes the WRA entity that will enter the Repair Cycle submodel, which will 
be discussed later.  Once the WRA exits the Repair Cycle submodel it proceeds to a 
Match Delay module.  This module allows entities from the repair cycle and from the 
Spare Pool module to enter the Pool module together.  There is no actual time delay, but 
this module is required for proper matching of aircraft and WRA entities at the Pool 
module. 
The Spare Pool module is a create module used to introduce spares into the supply 
chain.  The spare levels in the model are based on actual spare numbers with the 
exception of the RPYC spares.  The number of RPYC spares was assumed based on 
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average annual failures seen at the NAS Lemoore AIMD.  Since this model is based on 
144 aircraft, not 438 (total F/A-18 inventory), the spare levels are a percentage of the 
actual levels.  Table 3 identifies the number of spares used in this model, for record 
keeping purposes.9 




RPYC 130  
Table 3.   Spare Levels 
 
Once the aircraft entity has matched with a WRA entity there is now one entity 
created from the two.  The aircraft and its new WRA proceed to the applicable 
Installation module, Figure 13.  To eliminate the additional entity, a Dispose module is 
used to escort the additional entity out of the model. 
The FRC Repair Cycle, Figure 11, is more complex than previous sections due to 
the detail required of the model pertaining to the I-level repair effort.  Since proponents 
claim ARGCS will reduce several aspects of this repair cycle, the model includes enough 
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Figure 11.     FRC Repair Cycle 
 
                                                 
9 NAVAIR Informational CDROM, APG-65 Radar Fleet Support Team, October 2006. 
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The first module, TRANS to FRC, delays WRAs entering from Figure 10 to 
account for transportation and is followed by a Record module to count transportation 
events.  All transportation modules assign a truck, and accordingly apply a usage cost per 
delay.  Transportation of NAS Lemoore WRAs will take place locally, which essentially 
costs next to nothing and takes very little time.  On the other hand, WRAs traveling to 
and from NAS Fort Worth, NAS Fallon, or Depot will have different delays at different 
rates due to the additional distance to transport.  Since this rate information was not 
available, an assumed average transportation charge of $200 and a delay of 1-2 days 
distributed uniformly were used for all transportation events. 
The Setup module assigns a Sailor to accomplish the appropriate setup required 
for the WRA entering the repair cycle.  This setup time is different for each WRA.  Once 
setup is complete, the WRA will proceed for testing. 
  The Test module then assigns a Sailor for an exponential delay based on 
applicable test times. Once a WRA enters its respective repair cycle, the model assumes 
delays based on historic information applicable to that particular WRA.  Table 4 
represents the type and associated delay associated with each WRA.10  The repair delays 
in Table 4 were provided by Aerospace Group, Wyle Laboratories Inc. (G. Jacobson, 
personnel communication, August, 2006). 
 
WRA Set up Delay (Normal Dist) Test Delay (Exponential) Repair Delay (Exponential)
RTDP .3 hours, std dev .1 hours 2 hours 5 hours
Ant .3 hours, std dev .1 hours 1.5 hours 8 hours
RE 1.5 hours, std dev .25 hours 4.3 hours 9 hours
RPYC .5 hour, std dev .1 hours 2.5 hours 2 hours  
Table 4.   I-Level Repair Cycle Delays 
 
Once tested, the WRA proceeds to the FRC_Repair module where it seizes a 
Sailor for an exponential delay based on applicable repair times (Table 4).  After repair 
the WRA proceeds to a second set of Setup and Test modules.  These modules perform 
the same function as the modules preceding the FRC_Repair module. 
                                                 
10 Steve J. Padilla, Principal Tech Support Engineer-Radar Field Engineering & Matthew R. Corney, 
Sr Customer Support Engineer-Field Engineering, NAS Lemoore, CA, interviewed October 2006. 
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Once RFI tested, the WRA proceeds to a decision module (Retest) to determine 
whether or not the WRA actually passed the RFI test.  The retest percentage after each 
WRA has been tested for RFI is assumed at 20% to simulate 1 in 5 WRAs requiring 
further repair.  This assumption is based on personal experience and discussions with 
technicians at NAS Lemoore.  These retests are not a result of the inability to repair a 
WRA, but a failed repair attempt.  Failures proceed back to the FRC_Repair module.  
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Figure 12.     BCM/Depot Repair 
 
If the WRA is determined to be Beyond the Capability of Maintenance (BCM), it 
will proceed for transportation to Depot level repair via the TRANS to NADEP module.  
Each WRA has an applicable BCM rate based on historical data.  Table 5 displays the 
BCM rates that apply to each WRA.11  A record module counts transportation of the 
WRA from the previous module. 
 




RPYC 9% 55  
Table 5.   BCM Rates 
                                                 
11 NAVAIR Informational CDROM, APG-65 Radar Fleet Support Team & Wyle Laboratories, Inc. 
Aerospace Group Integrated Logistics Supportability Team, October 2006. 
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Once the WRA arrives to the depot (represented by the NADEP_repair module) it 
assigns a Depot level technician for an assumed exponential distribution delay of 10 days 
to account for the time taken to repair the WRA at depot.  This assumption is based on 
discussion with technicians and personal experience. Unfortunately, after repeated 
requests, the average Depot repair cost of each WRA was not provided, so each event 
was assumed to cost $5,000.  In the future, if this information is provided, it could easily 
be input into the model to more accurately predict actual depot maintenance costs. 
Once repaired the WRA proceeds for transportation (TRANS from NADEP) and 
is routed to the Match Delay module seen in Figure 10.  Those WRAs not considered 
BCM (i.e. actually repaired at the FRC) proceed to the TRANS from FRC module.  From 
this module the WRA proceeds to the Match Delay module in Figure 10. 
Finally, once the aircraft has received its replacement WRA, it proceeds to the 
Installation module, Figure 13, where it repeats the actions associated with the removal 
module earlier in the simulation.  Since the removal and installation both charge half of 
the repair cost, the total repair cost associated with the applicable WRA is totaled.  After 
the delay associated with this module, the aircraft proceeds to the Fixed routing module 
where it proceeds to the Flightline station module shown previously in Figure 2. 
 
RT installation RT Fixed
     0  




IV. MODEL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. BASE MODEL  
The model was set up to simulate 40 replications lasting 360 days each The model 
was able to identify the average Operational Availability, number of FMC aircraft, 
number of breaks for each of the identified WRAs, and number of Depot repairs.  In 
addition, associated costs such as average O-level repair cost (cost to the operational unit 
per WRA ordered), average I-level labor cost, average Depot repair cost, and average 
transportation costs associated with the repair cycle were identified. 
As stated previously, the Base Model involved 144 aircraft that had an average of 
85 hours between failures using an exponential distribution.  Based on this failure rate, an 
average of 10,310 failures occurred every 360 day period.  Of those 10,310 failures, 17% 
of these failures actually resulted in WRAs being tested.  Table 6 identifies the results 
associated with the base model simulation. 
 
Operational Availability 68% Transportation Cost 693,695.00$        
FMC A/C 98 I-Level Cost 1,139,933.40$     
RT Breaks 209 O-Level RT 8,055,162.50$     
Ant Breaks 512 O-Level Ant 10,155,750.00$   
RE Breaks 312 O-Level RE 8,418,600.00$     
RPYC Breaks 722 O-Level RPYC 3,321,085.00$     
RT Depot Repairs 11 RT Depot Cost 55,625.00$          
Ant Repairs 23 Ant Depot Cost 119,125.00$        
RE Depot Repairs 19 RE Depot Cost 99,250.00$          
RPYC Depot Repairs 55 RPYC Depot Cost 284,875.00$        
32,343,100.90$  Total Repair Cycle Cost  
Table 6.   Base Scenario Results 
 
B. SCENARIO 1: FASTER TPS RUN TIMES 
One of the claimed advantages of utilizing the ARGCS technology is faster TPS 
run times.  In the first scenario, the test times for each WRA were reduced at various 
levels from 5%-50%.  Before these results are discussed, an explanation of the model 
limitations concerning operational availability needs to be addressed.    
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In order to maintain the number of failures at a steady rate and compensate for the 
simulation anomaly discussed on page 8, the fail limiter was created.  Unfortunately, the 
fail limiter introduced a problem in the operational availability calculation.  Because the 
fail limiter did not allow any failures after the pre-determined limit was reached, the 
operational availability during the last portion of each replication went up to 100% (no 
aircraft failures), skewing the results higher than expected.    
In order to reduce the impact the fail limiter had on operational availability, a 
terminating condition was created.  The introduction of the terminating condition stopped 
the replication as soon as the fail limit was reached.  However, due to the limited scope of 
this project, we were not able to conduct sensitivity analysis on the impact of the fail-
limiter module or the terminating condition, and hence we cannot be certain exactly how 
much that approximation may have skewed the results.  It may be that reducing TPS run 
times would have a greater or lesser impact on availability than our results indicate, and 
we cannot be precise in the impact of this factor vice other considerations (e.g., increased 
accuracy). 
Operational availability is comprised of many different factors, one of which is 
scheduled maintenance.  Based on project team experience, the typical squadron will 
have approximately 10% of its aircraft fleet undergoing some type of scheduled 
maintenance.  This means that normally, the best operational availability a squadron 
could expect is approximately 90%.  Scheduled maintenance was not a focus of our 
research so it was not included in the simulation model. To account for scheduled 
maintenance, the operational availability results produced by the simulation were 
multiplied by 90%.  For example, if the simulation model results indicated operational 
availability was 80%, we adjusted that number downward to 72% by multiplying by 0.9.   
Figure 14 demonstrates the effect reduced run times have on operational 
availability.  As indicated, by reducing TPS run times by 50%, operational availability of 
the 144 aircraft in the simulation improved by 12% (68% to 80%).  
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Figure 14.     Effects of Faster TPS Run Times on Operational Availability 
 
The costs associated with run times are limited to I-level labor ($50 per/hour) 
required to perform the WRA testing (G. Jacobson, personal communication, October 
2006).  The Maintenance Man-Hours (MMH) required are reduced as a result of faster 
run times. Table 7 displays reduced MMH numbers at different reduced TPS run times.  
Figure 15 demonstrates the effect the reduced run times have on the total cost of I-level 
labor. 
 
Run Time Reduction Total MMH MMH saved Percentage of Total MMH
0% (Base) 22803.99 0 0%
15% 22042.36 761.63 3%
30% 20558.66 2245.33 10%
45% 19148.44 3655.55 16%  
Table 7.   Reduction in MMH 
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Figure 15.     Effects of Faster TPS Run Times on I-Level Labor Cost 
 
C. SCENARIO 2: INCREASED ACCURACY 
ARGCS technologies claim to increase the accuracy as well as the timeliness of 
troubleshooting.12  In order to assess these claims, model inputs were adjusted to reduce 
the number of WRA failures that actually enter the repair cycle.  By doing this, the model 
simulates reductions in false pulls at the O-level.  The cost savings associated with this 
adjustment are mostly realized at the O-level due to less WRA orders.  Additionally, 
transportation costs associated with those orders are reduced.  I-level labor cost savings 
are minimal due to the small percentage of WRAs that are actually false pulls at the O-
level.  It does, however, decrease the number of WRAs waiting in the queue for repair at 
the I-level, which may have some positive impact on inventory carrying cost.  This 
potential impact is outside the scope of this research.   Furthermore, this concentrates 
more I-level labor on WRAs that actually require a repair action, thus returning them to 
RFI condition at a faster rate.  Table 8 represents the effect a 50% reduction in false pulls 
at the O-level has on the model and Table 9 represents the effect of a 100% reduction. 
                                                 
12 Defense Information Systems Agency, Agile Rapid Global Combat Support Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration Draft Integrated Assessment Plan, July 2006. 
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Operational Availability + 4%
FMC A/C + 5
Transportation Cost Savings $5,195.00
O-Level RT Savings $436,975.00
O-Level ANT Savings $123,500.00
O-Level RE Savings $466,425.00
O-Level RPYC Savings $111,550.00
Repair Cycle Cost Savings $1,143,645.00  
Table 8.   50% Reduction in False Pulls 
 
Operational Availability + 6%
FMC A/C + 9
Transportation Cost Savings $23,290.00
O-Level RT Savings $885,500.00
O-Level ANT Savings $408,250.00
O-Level RE Savings $631,125.00
O-Level RPYC Savings $274,505.00
Repair Cycle Cost Savings $2,222,670.00  
Table 9.   100% Reduction in False Pulls 
 
Another approach is to reduce the percentage of retested WRAs.  The model then 
sends fewer repaired WRAs back for repair at the applicable I-level repair station.  In 
other words, the WRA is more likely to be successfully repaired the first time.  The cost 
savings associated with this adjustment are realized mostly at the I-level of maintenance.  
Figure 16 represents the effects fewer additional repairs have on operational availability 












































D. SCENARIO 3: SPARES REDUCTION 
As the results in Scenario 1 indicate, operational availability increases as the TPS 
run times are reduced.  In this scenario, spares are reduced along with the run times.  
Table 10 represents the reduced number of spares required to attain the base model 
operational availability.  When spares were reduced to account for faster TPS run times, 
the model was run 5 years instead of one year as in the base scenario.  The longer run 
time was required due to the longer term effects associated with spare usage.  With the 
threshold for ARGCS faster run times at 15%, a 3% reduction in spares was realized.  
Assuming a 10% of standard price holding cost, a savings of $780,559.80 could result 
from this 15% reduction in test times.  The model was also simulated with a spares 
reduction at 40% reduction in test times, but the results appeared to be unrealistic so an 
accurate prediction could not be made.  With this in mind, it is realistic to predict a 
reduced level of spares beyond that predicted with the 15% run time reduction. 
 
WRA Spare Level +/- Standard Price Savings of
RTDP 63 -2 1,067,136$     2,134,272$   
Ant 37 -2 444,893$        889,786$      
RE 116 -4 1,047,905$     4,191,620$   
RPYC 126 -4 147,480$        589,920$      
7,805,598$   
$780,559.80
Total Standard Price Savings
Annual Inventory Holding Cost Savings (Holding Cost =10%)
 
Table 10.   Spares Reduction 
 
E. SCENARIO 4: INCREASED I-LEVEL REPAIR CAPABILITY 
Although ARGCS advocates do not claim to affect the repair capability at the I-
level of maintenance, it is nonetheless possible.  By increasing the accuracy and 
timeliness of troubleshooting, it is likely less WRAs will be sent to the Depot for repair.  
This claim is based on the assumption that some of the BCM decisions consist of WRAs 
sent to Depot as a result of repair fatigue.  The cost savings resulting from less WRAs 
repaired by the Depot are represented in Figure 18.  Due to the fact that BCM rates are 
relatively low to begin with, the resulting savings are limited to average Depot repair 
costs and associated transportation costs.  Additionally, it is likely a savings can be 
realized as a result of fewer spares required due to less WRAs going to Depot for repair. 
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Reduced BCM Rates 
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Figure 18.     Effects of Reduced BCM Rates on Depot Repair/Trans Costs 
 
F. BAD ACTOR DISCUSSION 
Bad Actors are defined as those WRAs that exhibit very low hour failures and 
multiple failures within short periods of time. The Fleet Support Team at NAS North 
Island has identified all Radar WRAs that have exhibited 4 or more failures within a 21 
month period.  Contributing factors to Bad Actors prevalence include poor maintenance 
practices, TPS deficiencies, and design flaws.  Due to its planned net-centric architecture, 
ARGCS technologies have the potential to improve visibility of bad actors by providing 
first hand failure information to the maintainer, TPS designers, and engineers, as well as 
allowing field level technicians real time access to subject matter experts.  Unfortunately, 
the project team was unable to determine a way to incorporate Bad Actors into the 
simulation model.  However, if the ADSR portion works as planned, significant savings 




As the Arena model results indicate, the greatest cost savings comes from 
decreasing the number of WRAs entering the repair cycle.  The reason for this is simple, 
when a WRA is pulled from an aircraft and inserted into the repair cycle, O-level 
maintenance is immediately charged a predetermined repair cost whether or not the WRA 
requires repair or not.  This repair cost is usually significant.  According to the Navy 
Inventory Control Point Asset Visibility System in July 2006, the standard price for a 
Radar Receiver Exciter is $1,047,905 and the repair price is $27,374.13 
As noted above, the limited scope of our project necessitated the use of a heuristic 
to limit failure rates. However, we see no reason why this heuristic would have skewed 
results so that decreasing the number of WRAs from entering the repair cycle would look 
exceptionally attractive.  We have not conducted sensitivity analysis on this point and 
thus we are not sure about the quality of our approximation.  Hence, interpretation of our 
numerical results must be done with caution.  
The key to reducing the logistics footprint and associated repair costs is keeping 
the WRA from entering the repair cycle in the first place.  There are two ways to 
accomplish this.  The first option is to reengineer the WRA to increase its inherent 
reliability and increase its MTBF.  Unfortunately, this is almost impossible to do without 
spending considerable time and money.  The second, (probably) more cost effective way 
is to improve troubleshooting techniques to reduce false pulls at the O-level and improve 
maintenance quality at the I-level. 
According to a recent study by the FCC Process Enhancement Team (PET) at 
Naval Air Station North Island, the FCC is often replaced at the O-level as a first step to 
troubleshooting any flight control system failure.  It is considered standard practice by 
many O-level activities, regardless of failure indication or A1-F18AC-570 
troubleshooting directions to begin the maintenance action by replacing an FCC.  On the 
                                                 
13 Navy Inventory Control Point Asset Visibility System, https://www.navsup.navy.mil, accessed 
August 2006. 
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occasional difficult flight system failure such as an intermittent aircraft wiring problem, 
multiple good FCC’s are removed before the actual aircraft problem is resolved.14  
ARGCS is envisioned to improve O-level troubleshooting techniques through the use of 
an O-level interface.  Exactly how much the tester will improve troubleshooting 
techniques is unknown, but the result of the simulation model indicates a 50% reduction 
in false pulls will save over $1.1M annually (Table 7).  More than $2M annual savings 
are realized if 100% of false pulls are eliminated (Table 8). 
The model predicted a 3% reduction in spares required to maintain the base model 
operational availability when TPS run times were reduced by 15%.  Since, the spares 
already exist there are no savings due to buying less, but if holding costs are calculated as 
a percentage of WRA standard price, carrying less spares through attrition can be realized 
(Table 8).  On the other hand, at a 40% reduction in TPS run times the spares reduction 
was over 50%, which is an unrealistic expectation in the opinion of the project team. 
Ultimately, there are several cost savings involved with the thresholds and 
objectives of the ARGCS system.  Faster TPS run times would have an immediate 
impact.  However, the database that makes ARGCS capable of reducing false pulls and/or 
increasing the accuracy of troubleshooting must be populated with accurate data, and 
populating the database will not be instantaneous.  It will likely take several months or 
perhaps years to adequately populate for increased maintenance effectiveness.  If and 
when the Services can ensure accurate maintenance data collection at the different levels 
of maintenance, the true benefits of ARGCS could be realized. 
                                                 
14 Mary Schmidt, FCC PET Problems Prioritized By Cost, Personal memo provided by William J. 
Greer, NAVAIRDEPOT 334. September 2006. 
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